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Abstract: We propose a theoretical framework for understanding the evolution
of the rule of law state, which is conceived as the equilibrium of a societal game
in which actors accept the legitimacy of publicly enunciated legal rules. A meta-
norm of respect for the sovereign legal power of the state is not self-forming on
the basis of private conduct, but requires the coevolution of impersonal market
exchange with effective state capacity to constitute and regulate markets. A
functioning legal system must acquire the means not just to control private
power but to constrain other organs of government. The emergence of such a
‘self-limiting state’ is an historical process which, while complementary to a
market order, is also contingent and path-dependent, and is not preordained.
Illustrating our argument with empirical evidence drawn from the contemporary
experience of middle-income countries, with a focus on China, we argue that
alternatives to the rule of law state, including interpersonal trust, closed net-
works and authoritarian political control, can only achieve limited scale and
scope effects, and are prone to high deadweight costs arising from corruption
and the capture of the public sphere by private interests. We also discuss the
potential of transplants of legal rules and institutions to catalyse the transition
to impersonal trade based on the rule of law, and present evidence, from time-
series econometric analysis, that the diffusion of shareholder protection laws
has the potential to support financial development in emerging markets.
Evolution towards the rule of law state is, we conclude, one possible develop-
mental path for middle-income countries.
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知止乎其所不能知, 至矣。若有不即是者, 天鈞敗之。
[To let understanding stop at what cannot be understood is a high attainment. Those who
cannot do it will be destroyed on the lathe of heaven.]
Zhuangzhi, Book XXIII; Ursula Le Guin, The Lathe of Heaven (New York: Avon, 1971), ch. 3.
1 Introduction
In this paper we advance and defend the proposition that the rule of law state is
a necessary condition of, but also an evolved response to, economic develop-
ment. History shows that no country has experienced industrialisation without
having significant state capacity to constitute and regulate the market. Among
the institutions of a market economy which are critically underpinned by the
state are money1 the banking and financial system2 and the labour market.3
Alongside a transparent and effective system of taxation and public finance,4 a
functioning legal system is a core part of state apparatus. The legal system is a
mechanism for actualising the power of the state. At the same time, the legal
system subjects other parts of the state, including the executive power, to
constraints which create a realm of autonomous interaction for individuals
and voluntary associations. The result is the self-limiting state, that is, a state
which acknowledges limits to its own knowledge, capacities and powers.
Our approach is to be distinguished, on the one hand, from theories which
downplay the role of public ordering in the operation of the legal system.5
Contrary to claims that legal norms can be generated entirely from the sponta-
neous interactions of economic agents, we see a role for a centralised rule-
making power in articulating legal norms which coordinate market activity. In
the absence of public norms, functional equivalents to law, such as authoritar-
ian government, corruption, or interpersonal trust, can sustain economic
growth, but only up to a point. These alternatives to the rule of law lack the
1 L. Wray, Modern Money Theory: A Primer on Macroeconomics for Modern Monetary Systems
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
2 K. Pistor, A Legal Theory of Finance, 41 Journal of Comparative Economics (2013), 315–330.
3 S. Deakin and F. Wilkinson, The Law of the Labour Market: Industrialisation, Employment, and
Legal Evolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
4 M. Daunton, Trusting Leviathan: The Politics of Taxation in Britain, 1799–1914 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001); id., Just Taxes: The Politics of Taxation in Britain, 1914–1979
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
5 G. Hadfield and B. Weingast, What is Law? A Coordination Account of the Characteristics of
Legal Order, 4 Journal of Legal Analysis (2012), 471–514.
124 D. Chen and S. Deakin Law and Development Review
Brought to you by | Newcastle University
Authenticated
Download Date | 7/30/15 12:32 PM
scale and scope effects of public legal enforcement, and cannot support the
complex division of labour which characterises mature market economies.6
Equally, our approach may be distinguished from analyses which empha-
sise the role of the developmental state to the exclusion of considerations of the
rule of law. The rapid growth of East Asian economies over the past half century
is often cited as an argument in favour of an active state which can direct the
process of industrialisation.7 In our view, this is only part of the story. It would
be a misreading of the developmental model to neglect the role which private
law plays, alongside public administration and regulation, in underpinning
market-based exchange. Accounts which argue, for example, that East Asian
states have experienced high rates of economic growth in the past century
precisely because they lacked effective legal support for contract and property
rights,8 overstate this case.
We develop our argument in a series of stages. In Section 2 we review recent
contributions to the debate over the rule of law in economic development with
the focus on the contemporary experience of middle-income countries. Drawing
on China’s example, we suggest that rather than seeing the rule of law and
informal institutions as alternatives or substitutes, we should view them as
complementary mechanisms for promoting growth. In Section 3 we pursue this
theme further by developing an analytical framework for the state–market
relation which draws on evolutionary game theory and systems theory. At the
core of our theoretical approach is the idea that the state and the market are
emergent, co-evolving and mutually stabilising social systems, which both
express and shape the strategic behaviour of agents. We illustrate this point
through a consideration of the China’s gradual and still incomplete evolution
from guanxi-based contracting to reliance on formal legal institutions to govern
commerce and trade. In Section 4 we widen the scope of our analysis to refer to
evidence on cross-national trends in shareholder protection and financial devel-
opment. Leximetric coding of legal-institutional data and time series econo-
metric analysis together enable us to examine the claim, associated with the
World Bank’s view of the rule of law, that the diffusion of legal norms from
mature industrialised economies can help stimulate economic development in
emerging markets. We will see that while there is some evidence of a “transplant
6 S. Deakin, D. Gindis, G. Hodgson, K. Huang and K. Pistor, Legal Institutionalism: Capitalism
and the Constitutive Role of Law, Journal of Comparative Economics (2015) (forthcoming).
7 A. Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialisation (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1989).
8 F. Allen, J. Qian and M. Zhang, An Alternative View on Law, Finance, Institutions and Growth,
Wharton Financial Institutions Center, Working Paper 11–64 (2011).
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effect”, legal change in developing countries is also endogenously generated as
a response to local conditions, supporting the hypothesis of legal and economic
coevolution. Section 5 concludes.
2 The rule of law and economic growth in
middle-income countries
Belief in the favourable economic impact of formal legal institutions was very
much in vogue during the 1990s and 2000s, in part as a result of the growing use
of metrics purporting to measure the quality of the rule of law. The World Bank’s
Rule of Law Index, a complex composite index built up from a wide range of
data sources on the operation of legal institutions, was invoked to show that the
nature of a country’s commitment to the rule of law significantly affected its
level of economic development. An improvement in the rule of law score by one
standard deviation from levels prevailing in Ukraine in the early 2000s would, it
was suggested, lead to a fourfold increase in per capital income over the long
term.9 Other studies, measuring the quality of institutions largely in terms of
how far they ensure the protection of private property, claimed to show that a
one-standard deviation difference in institutional effectiveness, roughly the
difference between Bolivia and South Korea, would produce a 2 log-point rise
in per capita incomes, or a sixfold difference in outcomes.10
The belief in the rule of law inspired extensive investment in legal reform
programmes led by the international financial institutions. Between 1991 and
2002 the World Bank supported over 300 “rule of law” projects in 100 countries,
at a reported cost of some $3.8 billion.11 However, these initiatives came to be
questioned as the expected relationship between legal reforms and economic
growth failed to materialise in a number of contexts. The value of law-centred
9 D. Kaufmann, “Governance Redux: The Empirical Challenge”, in X. Sala-i-Martín (ed.), The
Global Competitiveness Report 2003–2004 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 137–164.
10 D. Rodrik, A. Subramanian and F. Trebbi, Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over
Geography and Integration in Economic Development, 9 Journal of Economic Growth (2004), 131–165.
11 World Bank, Legal and Judicial Reform Observations, Experiences and Approach of the Legal
Vice Presidency (2002), available at: <http://www.worldbank.org/legal/publications/ljrobserva-
tions-final.pdf>, accessed 29 January, 2015; World Bank, Annual Report (Washington, DC:
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2003); World Bank, Annual Report
(Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2004).
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reform was called into question by research highlighting alternative mechanisms
for promoting economic development.12
One such alternative is the phenomenon of “economically benevolent dic-
tatorships” which, according to Ron Gilson and Curtis Milhaupt,13 describes
South Korea under Park Chung Hee (1961–1979), Chile under Augusto Pinochet
(1973–1990) and China under Deng Xiaoping and his successors (1978-present).
In these cases rapid economic development was based not on the rule of law but
on the ability of non-democratic governments to create “non-excludable” public
goods for the benefit of the wider population. By comparison to weak democ-
racies, benevolent dictators can better provide credible commitments to respect
property rights, enabling private actors to retain the fruits of entrepreneurial
activity. Such dictatorships, it is suggested, are less prone to favouring private
interest groups which can capture the democratic process and exploit it for their
own ends. When it comes to contract enforcement, direct government action
may be more effective in supporting impersonal exchange than a court-based
system.
Franklin Allen, Jun Qian and Chenying Zhang14 offer a further challenge to
the rule of law paradigm. On the basis of empirical studies of Asian systems
including China, Taiwan and India they argue that the rule of law is not merely
unnecessary but is a potential barrier to development. They characterise the
legal system as a monopoly which can be captured by private interest groups.
The fixed costs of revising the law and modifying legal institutions become
highly problematic in emerging markets which may lack effective state capacity
but also have the potential for rapid growth, rendering laws out of date. As a
result, businesses tend to sidestep the law, relying on reputation, relational
contracting and interpersonal trust to support economic and financial transac-
tions, in preference to state-backed legal enforcement through the courts.
These two studies correctly highlight the limits of using law as a mechanism
of economic coordination in developing economies. As Gilson and Milhaupt show,
it is effective state capacity, and not the rule of law alone, which is generally
12 J. Esquirol, Continuing Fictions of Latin American Law, 55 Florida Law Review (2003), 41–113;
B. Rajagopal, International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements and Third World
Resistance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); J. Ngugi, Reexamining the Role of
Private Property in Market Democracies: Problematic Ideological Issues Raised by Land
Registration, 25 Michigan Journal of International Law (2004), 467–528.
13 R. Gilson and C. Milhaupt, Economically Benevolent Dictators: Lessons for Developing
Democracies, 59 American Journal of Comparative Law (2011), 227–288.
14 Allen, Qian and Zhang (2011), supra note 8.
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essential to overcoming collective action problems which may inhibit the produc-
tion of the public goods on which a market economy depends.15 Allen, Qian and
Zhang demonstrate the extent to which the legal system is often irrelevant in
emerging market contexts.16 Even in developed economics such as the USA or
Britain, contracting between business parties generally takes place in isolation
from the court system, which deals with a tiny fraction of commercial disputes. An
extensive literature beginning with Stuart Macaulay’s seminal study17 argues that
long-term dealing and the existence of communal and/or personal ties between
business parties may be more effective in building trust than reliance on court-
based sanctions. The relative rigidity of the formal law and its tendency to lag
behind economic and technological developments, leading to avoidance strate-
gies, is also well established in socio-legal studies on contracting.18
However, the contrast between formal and informal institutions in these
critiques of the rule of law orthodoxy may be somewhat overdrawn. A minor-
itarian but still significant strand in the empirical literature on contracting
suggests that while informal institutions may provide a foundation for inter-
personal trust in small-scale settings with repeated exchange, formal laws,
where they enjoy legitimacy and effectiveness, constitute important trust-
assurance mechanisms in the context of large-numbers, impersonal
exchange.19 In a similar vein, there is evidence to suggest that the absence of
formal legal mechanisms limits the availability of external finance for firms in
emerging markets, in circumstances where overseas investors and other non-
insiders are unable to access local reputational resources for generating trust.20
The impartial administration of the law can operate as a check on the
exercise of governmental authority and on the power of incumbents in contexts
where economic development continues to be shaped by an activist state and
informal commercial and business networks.21 More generally, the role of the
15 Gilson and Milhaupt (2011), supra note 13.
16 Allen, Qian and Zhang (2011), supra note 8.
17 S. Macaulay, Non-contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 American
Sociological Review (1963), 1–23.
18 H. Collins, Regulating Contracts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
19 A. Arrighetti, R. Bachmann and S. Deakin, Contract Law, Social Norms and Inter-firm
Cooperation, 21 Cambridge Journal of Economics (1997), 171–195.
20 R. Rajan and L. Zingales, Which Capitalism? Lessons from the East Asian Crisis, 11 Journal of
Applied Corporate Finance (1998), 40–48; R. Cooter and H.-B. Schaefer, Solomon’s Knot: How
Law Can End the Poverty of Nations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011).
21 R. Rajan and L. Zingales, The Persistence of Underdevelopment: Institutions, Human Capital
or Constituencies, CEPR Discussion Paper 5867 (2006).
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law in emerging markets is not confined to protecting property and contract
rights, but could be understood more broadly as facilitating economic participa-
tion and substantive market access through a range of social guarantees.22
Neutral processes of dispute resolution may help maintain social stability in
fast growing economies.23
A distinction should be drawn between “private ordering in the shadow
of the law”, that is, alternative forms of contracting which operate in the
presence of the rule of law, and “private ordering under a dysfunctional public
order”, that is, forms which operate in the absence of a neutral and effective
mechanism for contract enforcement. In developed countries where courts
are used as a last resort and business contracting takes place largely autono-
mously from the legal system, the law still operates as a “backstop” in a way
which affects contractual strategies.24 In emerging markets which lack fully
effective legal ordering, the costs of using alternative mechanisms of contract
enforcement based on interpersonal trust may become a drag on growth as
the economy develops. This implies a sequencing approach to building legal
institutions: a given mix of public and private enforcement may work well
at early stages of development but may not be sustainable over the longer
term.25
Country-specific industrial and political factors shape the path of legal and
economic change in particular middle-income economies. Bank-led finance,
which makes fewer demands on judicial and regulatory resources than arms-
length finance through equity or bond markets, may be expected to play a major
role in countries where growth is led by manufacturing and natural resources
firms and where judicial and legal institutions are still in the course of devel-
oping.26 State-led finance may be important in industries which involve the
22 F. Upham, Mythmaking in the Rule of Law Orthodoxy (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace Rule of Law Studies 2006).
23 R. Peerenboom, The Political Economy of Rule of Law in Middle Income Countries: A Comparison
of Eastern Europe and China (2010), available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=L1673581>, accessed
29 January, 2015.
24 J. McMillan and C. Woodruff, Private Order under Dysfunctional Public Order, 98 Michigan
Law Review (2000), 2421–2458; D. Chen, Corporate Governance, Enforcement and Financial
Development: The Chinese Experience (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013); D. Chen, Developing
a Stock Market without Institutions – The China Puzzle, 13 Journal of Corporate Law Studies
(2013), 151–184.
25 Chen (2013), ibid.
26 A. Berger and G. Udell, The Economics of Small Business Finance: The Roles of Private Equity
and Debt Markets in the Financial Growth Cycle, 22 Journal of Banking and Finance (1998), 613–673;
R. Carpenter and B. Petersen, Capital Market Imperfections, High-tech Investment, and New Equity
Financing, 112 Economic Journal (2002), 54–72.
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replication of existing technologies or the exploitation of natural resources,27
implying a prominent role for government-owned banks in the process of
economic transition.28
On one view, China’s recent experience shows that formal legal institu-
tions are not needed in order for economic growth to occur in emerging
markets.29 Instead, the developmental state can act as a substitute for law
in building trust. At local level this takes the form of state support for the
Town and Village enterprises and the use of local government mechanisms to
enforce contracts and property rights.30 At central level, the party-state
apparatus perform a role of bureaucratic mediation between different interest
groups.31 Traditional forms of interpersonal trust and informal networks
(gaunxi) persist into the era of modernisation, providing a foundation for
business relationships.32
China also appears to have benefited from the sequencing of legal and
financial reforms. The economy has been liberalised gradually, in tandem with
efforts to build elements of a more formal legal system and institutions. The
government retains ownership stakes in most state-owned enterprises, which
have been “corporatised” via partial listings, rather than transferred in their
entirety to private hands.33 At the same time, survey evidence suggests that
levels of trust in the formal legal system are increasing, and that there has been
a narrowing of the “implementation gap” between law on the books and law in
action.34 The thesis of law’s irrelevance therefore does not seem to capture all
aspects of China’s transition to a market economy.
27 B. Eichengreen, The European Economy Since 1945: Coordinated Capitalism and Beyond
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).
28 S. Andrianova, P. Demetriades and A. Shortland, Government Ownership of Banks,
Institutions and Financial Development, Journal of Development Economics 85 (2008), 218–252.
29 Allen, Qian and Zhang, supra note 8.
30 M. Trebilcock and J. Leng, The Role of Formal Contract Law and Enforcement in Economic
Development, 92 Virginia Law Review (2005), 1517–1580.
31 M. Aoki, Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001).
32 S. Lubman, Bird in a Cage: Legal Reform in China after Mao (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford
University Press, 1999).
33 J. Leng, Corporate Governance and Financial Reform in China’s Transition Economy (Hong
Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009).
34 Peerenboom (2010), supra note 23.
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3 Coevolution of the market and the rule of law
state: a theoretical framework and application
to the Chinese case
We may hypothesise on the basis or emerging evidence from the Chinese case
that a rule of law state is both cause and effect of sustainable economic devel-
opment. This insight is supported by coevolutionary models of law–economy
relations of the kind that are found at the intersection of game theory, systems
theory and the economics of law.35
According to this theoretical framework, formal legal institutions meet
needs which arise in the context of an economy which is moving from inter-
personal trust with small numbers exchange to large-scale, impersonal transact-
ing. In this approach, legal institutions are endogenous to the economic growth
path of a particular country. It follows that they are unlikely to be functional in
the absence of certain social and commercial practices to which public enforce-
ment is complementary.36 For successful transplants of formal institutions to
occur, therefore, a certain pre-existing level of development is needed. Once
functioning legal mechanisms are in place, however, they have the potential to
foster further growth. Thus the relationship between legal institutions and
economic growth is one of incremental coevolution.
While the quality of institutions does matter for economic performance,37
the polity is not prior to the economy. Rather, as Masahiko Aoki puts it,38
the polity and economic organisations (and thus economic performance) coevolve through
a long historical process, rather than the former [being] prior to the latter as shorter-run
observations might often appear to suggest. Theoretically, this view is derived from a
game-perspective in which institutions both in the polity and the economy are regarded as
emerging, sustaining themselves and changing endogenously through strategic behaviours
of agents. Specifically, the political state is identified with a deep stable state of
the political game. Then, political institutions and economic organisations/institutions
are linked together through complementary and/or substitute relations with and across
35 S. Deakin, Legal Evolution: Integrating Economic and Systemic Approaches, 7 Review of Law
and Economics (2011), 659–683.
36 Y.-S. Lee, Scholars out of Self-estrangement: A Call for A New Analytical Model for Law and
Development, mimeo (2015, forthcoming).
37 D. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990); D. Acemoglu and J. Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The
Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty (New York: Crown, 2012).
38 M. Aoki, How Polities Change: A Strategic Perspective on China-Japan Historical Comparison?
Journal of Comparative Economics (2015) (forthcoming).
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individual agents’ strategic choices. Thus it may sometimes appear that changes in the
polity are prior to changes in other institutions, but at a deeper level they can only co-
change. Otherwise, they would not be stable and sustainable.
In this game theoretical perspective, the law assists coordination among
boundedly rational agents by signalling to them the likely strategies that will be
followed in particular market (or other social) settings. Legal rules are “summary
representations” of commonly followed strategies or “states of play” in society.
The law is a “cognitive resource” which stores information about societal
coordination and transmits it to agents operating in the market domain. The
state is not so much a sovereign power as an endogenous normative order which
reflects the society in which it is embedded. The legal system, as one of the
mechanisms of the state, may seek to influence social outcomes in an instru-
mental way, but that is only one of the routes through which legal norms take
effect; inducing “bargaining in the shadow of the law” may more effective as a
regulatory strategy than “command and control” regulation. The law’s role may
be residual and indirect, or even hidden from view for many social actors who
have no encounter with the court system, but the possibility of court enforce-
ment can be expected to influence which strategies endure, and which are
selected out, through the repeated play of agents.
Coevolutionary models in game theory39 and systems theory40 recognise the
domain-specific quality of legal rules: in other words, legal relations and market
relations are distinct, with neither being reducible to the other. The content of
rules of law is endogenous to, and so broadly reflective of, social practices,
which accumulate over time as agents’ strategies develop and mutate in
response to their environment. The development of impersonal exchange and
the deepening of the division of labour in a market economy create demand for
public mechanisms of contract enforcement and for a contract law which
instantiates notions of commercial good practice and thereby serves as a guide
for action. However, to say that the law reflects practice and evolves over time in
response to commercial developments is not to say that it is reduced to social
practice: the law is not simply private ordering writ large.
Legal rules which are publicly enunciated and applied have a number of
features which complement the emergence and extension of impersonal
exchange.41 The first is their accessibility: publicly recorded legal rules are
intended to be ascertainable without resort to the specialised meanings
39 Aoki (2001), supra note 31.
40 N. Luhmann, Law as a Social System, K. Ziegert (trans), F. Kastner, R. Nobles, D. Schiff and
R. Ziegert (eds.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
41 Deakin et al. (2015), supra note 6.
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characteristic of social norms prevailing among dense networks and clan-type
relations. A further feature of publicly articulated rules is their neutrality: legal
rules in a functioning rule of law state are capable of being applied in a way
which is independent of the wealth or status of the parties concerned. Judicial
independence from private interests, and not simply from the executive power of
the state, is key to the claim of the rule of law state to ensure equality of market
access for all citizens. A third feature of public-legal rules is their stability.
Purely private rule systems such as those based on commercial arbitration or
private dispute resolution rarely acquire the features of doctrinal consistency,
predictability and constancy which are associated with the legal order.
This stability of legal rules need not, however, imply their immutability.
While the rigidity of the law may be a problem in rapidly developing economies,
a developed system of commercial law is capable of responding to changes in
the technological or commercial context of particular transactions. Legal sys-
tems possess mechanisms for and receiving filtering information from society or
the economy, for example through litigation which can operate as a mechanism
of selection and deselection of rules,42 or through the legislative process, which
can generate knowledge through commissions of inquiry and public debate.43
Legal discourse may for much of the time be self-referential or “operatively
closed” to direct outside influence yet still, in the language of systems theory,
be “cognitively open”, that is, capable of translating information from the
economic or political system into the juridical forms and terms which inform
legal reasoning.44 Thus it is possible to view legal rules as exogenous in the short
run – external parameters to or constraints on actors’ choices and strategies –
while endogenous in the long run, that is, adjusting over time to changes in their
economic or political context. The fit between legal rules and their context may
not always be precise or exact. Misalignments and lags are more likely than not
to occur, particularly in periods of rapid change. Legal evolution displays
tendencies towards path dependence and institutional lock-in. But this is not
the same thing as saying that the legal system is inherently rigid or fixed, or
incapable to adjusting to a changing context.
In a coevolutionary framework, the debate about enforcement can be seen
in a new light. It has long been accepted that a distinction needs to be drawn for
42 P. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 Journal of Legal Studies (1977), 51–64;
G. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Evolution of Efficient Rules, 6 Journal of Legal
Studies (1977), 65–82.
43 S. Deakin, Evolution for Our Time: A Theory of Legal Memetics, 55 Current Legal Problems
(2003), 1–42.
44 Luhmann (2004), supra note 40.
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the purposes of sociological or economic analysis between formal law, or “law
on the books”, and the practical application or reception of legal rules, or “law
in action”. The adoption of a rule according to the conventions associated with a
given governmental entity’s “rule of recognition”, implying its acceptance as
positive law according to criteria accepted by public officials, may mean nothing
at all in terms of the application or operation of that rule in a commercial or
other setting. As Aoki stresses,45 for a given law to operate as a social institution
requires that, at some level and to at least a minimal degree, it is accepted by
social actors, and internalised in their practices. At the same time, the non-
acceptance of a given legal norm by the community of social actors to which it is
addressed does not, in itself, deprive that norm of its formal status as a rule of
positive law. In a society characterised by the rule of law, the attribution of legal
validity to a given norm necessarily creates the potential for the implementation
of that norm at the level of social and commercial practice.46
One way for this to be achieved is through the public sanctioning of conduct
which departs from a given norm. However, enforcement may be less effective as
a strategy than legitimation. Strict public enforcement of norms is double-edged:
if the rule is not accepted as legitimate, actors will invest in strategies of
avoidance. The normative force of legal rules depends partly on the severity
and likelihood of sanctioning but to a greater extent on the degree of its
acceptance by the community of actors. A rule of law state is one with the
unusual and distinctive capacity to actualise legal rules simply by virtue of their
formal adoption as positive rules of law, but this power is not self-generating at
the level of the legal system. It cannot be enacted or enunciated using legal
formulas. It depends rather on the existence of a meta-norm, shared across a
population of actors, of respect for norms which have a public-legal form,
irrespective of their precise content.
Empirical studies based on field experiments and similar behavioural meth-
odologies suggest that meta-norms of this kind are more widespread in democ-
racies than in authoritarian states. The incidence of “altruistic punishment”, or
the phenomenon of actors incurring a private cost to punish uncooperative
behaviour, is highest in democratic societies, while the opposite tendency,
“antisocial punishment” or sanctioning those who comply with public norms,
is most widespread in autocracies.47 It would seem that participation in the rule
making process, expressed through the institutions of representative democracy,
45 Aoki (2001), supra note 31.
46 Deakin et al. (2015), supra note 6.
47 See H. Gintis, The Bounds of Reason: Game Theory and the Unification of the Social Sciences
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), ch. 3.
134 D. Chen and S. Deakin Law and Development Review
Brought to you by | Newcastle University
Authenticated
Download Date | 7/30/15 12:32 PM
is conducive to the emergence of the societal meta norm of respect for publicly
enunciated rules, which is nothing more or less than the “deep stable state”, in a
game theoretical sense, of the rule of law itself.
China’s recent trajectory illustrates the relevance of a coevolutionary perspec-
tive on economic development.48 Until the 1978 reforms, private property was
effectively extinct and all means of production were vested in the state or its
inferior form, the collective. Strictly speaking, there were no transactions in the
sense of commodity exchange. All disputes were settled by the government in its
capacity as common owner, and legal rules governing market transactions were
completely redundant. Even prior to the effective abolition of the legal system
during the Cultural Revolution, the legal system had ceased to function in any
meaningful sense, as central planning determined the content of economic policy.
The irrelevance of formal law persisted into the early part of the reform era
and it was guanxi that played a crucial role in attracting foreign direct invest-
ment and market building in this period. In order to encourage investment, a
formal legal measure, the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Joint
Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment, was passed in 1979. The law
had little impact, however. Foreign investment was deterred by the lack of clear
protection for property rights and the fear of policy reversal. In 1983, FDI inflows
into China accounted for less than US$1 billion. Interpersonal trust or guanxi
between Hong Kong investors and businesses in Guangdong province, rather
than the legal framework, was responsible for the subsequent growth of FDI. The
majority of Hong-Kong based Chinese originate from Guangdong and they have
various familial and lineage-based links to communities based there. Between
1983 and 1995, Hong Kong accounted for 59% of accumulated FDI in China, 56%
of which was received by Guangdong.
While at the outset of the reform period there was in effect no market in
China and state ownership of the means of production excluded a role for
private property rights, private actors were able to access economic resources
through guanxi-type relations with government officials and managers of state-
owned enterprises. This led to the emergence of organised forms of production
outside the state sector. Guanxi helped many newly formed private firms to
survive political attacks as they were constituted as town and village enterprises
(the “red hats” phenomenon).
The rapid expansion of market relations in China during the 1990s cannot be
attributed to the legal system. Rather, trust-based mechanisms of the kind identi-
fied by the literature on informal contracting – the threat of loss of future trading
48 See Chen, Corporate Governance, (2013), supra note 23, on which the following paragraphs
are based.
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opportunities and the costs of exclusion from dense, interpersonal networks –
enabled the economy to grow. However, even from this early stage the limits of
guanxi were becoming clear. FDI was concentrated in the coastal areas where
guanxi was well established. As a result, the income gap between the coastal
provinces and other Chinese regions grew rapidly, and became a challenge to
economic policy and to the maintenance of social order. Maintaining guanxi came
at a cost. According to the Hong Kong Independent Commission on Corruption at
the end of the 1990s, the costs of outright bribes and equivalent gifts and
payments in mainland China amounted to 3–5% of operating costs or between
US$3–5 billion worth of FDI. Although guanxi worked as a coping strategy for
dealing with abuses of bureaucratic power, it also catalysed new forms of bureau-
cratic corruption. Guanxi-type relations made it possible for political insiders to
make fortunes from the sale of quotas and permits. Corruption of this kind was a
direct trigger of the 1989 Incident, the gravest political crisis after 1978.
The limits of guanxi have become clearer as the economy has continued to
grow. Guanxi is a localised phenomenon and its benefits are generally confined
to members of closed networks. Guanxi engenders high transaction costs as
firms have to invest in building interpersonal ties each time they enter a new
market. The larger the firm, the greater the investment it has to make in guanxi.
At some point the deadweight costs of the guanxi system will begin to
outweigh its benefits. As private enterprise has continued to grow to the point
where it has outstripped the state sector, demand for formal legal rules which
would limit the costs of relying on guanxi has developed. This accounts in large
part for the rapid increase in the rate of adoption of new commercial laws since
the 1990s. While many of the components of these laws are borrowed from
mature market economies, they also reflect social practices within China and are
increasingly tailored to meet the needs of market actors based there.
In so far as China’s legal development reflects a shift in the demand for
formal legal institutions and not simply a top-down response to the social
pressures associated with rapid growth, we might expect new laws to be self-
enforcing to a large extent. However, the gap between “law in the books” and
“law in action” remains substantial, and legal norms often lack both enforce-
ment and legitimation effects. The result is a prisoner’s dilemma: although
effective enforcement and observance of laws would be in the long-term inter-
ests of all market actors, it is not necessarily in the interests of individual
players. Parties have strong incentives to tilt the interpretation and application
of legal rules in their own favour. Unless there is an independent court system
which has the remit of ensuring that laws are impartially and neutrally enforced,
the potential of formal laws in reducing transaction costs and providing a basis
for impersonal exchange will not be realised.
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A feature of emerging markets is that the societal meta-norm of respect for
publicly enunciated legal rule is lacking. A meta-norm of this kind can only be
established once there is a common belief in the ultimate sovereign effect of the
legal order, that is, its equal application to all actors including those of the state
itself. As long as some actors stand above the law and state power is inter-
mingled with private interests, complying with legal norms will not become the
first best strategy of most social or commercial actors. Bringing political elites
within the reach of the legal process and recognising the domain-specific
character of legal rules are complementary strategies for embedding the rule
of law in emerging markets.
4 Legal transplants and financial development:
evidence from leximetrics and time-series
econometrics
One means of catalysing the rule-of-law state in emerging markets is the diffu-
sion or transplantation of legal norms and institutions across national bound-
aries. Alongside theoretical advances in the analysis of the law-economy
relation, the empirical study of legal diffusion has been revolutionised by
methodological advances in the quantification of legal rules (“leximetrics”)
which began in the mid-1990s. The impetus for this process started with econo-
metric studies which sought to test for correlations between cross-national
variations in shareholder and creditor protection, on the one hand, and the
extent of financial development across regions and countries, on the other. Early
results from this line of work appeared to show that higher levels of protection
for investors and creditors had tangible effects on flows of equity finance and
bank lending.49 They also showed that common law (or English legal origin)
systems were generally more protective of shareholder and creditor rights. These
complementary results generated the legal origin hypothesis, the claim that
there was a causal link running from the infrastructure of legal systems through
to the content of specific norms to outcomes which were reflected in financial
market variables.50
49 R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 Journal of
Political Economy (1998), 1113–1155.
50 R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46
Journal of Economic Literature (2008), 285–332.
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Legal origin theory addressed a need in econometric analysis to overcome
the problem of the endogeneity of institutions to their economic and social
context. Since institutions respond to economic and social conditions as much
as they shape them, a statistical correlation between institutions and growth
does not equate to causation. Legal origin theory seemed to offer a solution: a
single variable, in the form of the common law or civil law origin of a country’s
legal system, could be seen as genuinely exogenous, in the sense of being
unconnected to country-specific industrial and financial conditions. This is
because, with the exception of a small number of parent systems, in which the
infrastructure of law making emerged alongside specific patterns of economic
growth and development, whether a particular country inherited its legal insti-
tutions from the common law or civil law was largely a matter of historical
accident. Indigenous economic factors were less important than military con-
quest and colonisation in driving legal diffusion; during the formative period of
legal development in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, very few systems
were in a position to make a conscious choice in favour of one mode or type of
legal infrastructure over another.51
In panel data econometric analyses, the legal origin indicator which initially
appeared as an instrumental variable was now adapted to provide a direct
causal explanation of cross-national variations in economic performance.52 At
a time when the limits of globalisation were starting to become clear, this result
provided an explanation for the persistence of diverse national conditions which
could be explained in terms of deep-rooted path dependencies. At the same
time, common law modes of law and governance continued to be seen as
inherently more suited to the creation of national environments for “doing
business”.53
The legal origin hypothesis engendered a huge response, much of it highly
critical, but over time a debate over methods has developed, which has resulted
in some refinement of the initial data coding efforts, while a more diverse range
of econometric techniques has been used to test for relationships of causation
and correlation. “Leximetric” coding methods have been used to develop a more
fine-grained approach to the coding of legal data which has produced multi-year
time series of trends in legal development. These longitudinal datasets make it
possible to test for lags or delays in the consequences of legal change and to
51 E. Glaeser and A. Shleifer, Legal Origins, 117 Quarterly Journal of Economics (2002),
1193–1229.
52 La Porta et al. (2008), supra note 50.
53 World Bank, Doing Business Reports (Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, various years).
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take into account the possibility of multi-directional causal flows, with economic
development affecting legal change as well as vice versa.54
Longitudinal data series in law and finance generally possess the statistical
property of “non-stationarity” according to which exogenous shocks can gen-
erate persistent movements away from equilibrium variables. Techniques devel-
oped within econometric theory for dealing with non-stationary data include the
family of cointegrated vector autoregression (CVAR) models, which view the
economy “as a highly complex dynamic system, the properties of which must be
inferred from data reflecting a single (nonreplicable) realisation of a multivari-
ate, path-dependent process”.55 These techniques can be used to test for the
short-run effects of legal changes on the economy, which can modelled as
fluctuations around a stable equilibrium, and for long-run deviations from the
equilibrium path. Thus they can be used to test for the immediate effects of legal
changes on financial indicators, which may be substantial but short-lived, and
for more lasting consequences of legal change, which can shift economies from
one equilibrium path to another. These methods are accordingly well suited to
testing the dynamic changes which occur within emerging markets as they
adjust to the combined effects of economic and institutional change.
There are few statistical studies which directly compare the experience of
developed and developing countries in adjusting to legal change over time. One
such study undertakes an analysis of the CBR Shareholder Protection Index
(CBR-SPI) which tracks the impact of legal reforms in a panel of 25 developed
and developing countries over the period 1995–2005.56 The panel includes the
larger middle-income countries including China, India and Brazil. The SPI
measures the rate of legal adoption of pro-shareholder reforms in these coun-
tries. Thus relevant indicator include those tracking the degree to which coun-
tries have adopted norms on board structure, shareholder voice and voting
rights, and protection of minority shareholder interests in the context of
54 J. Armour, S. Deakin, P. Sarkar, M. Siems and A. Singh, Shareholder Protection and Stock
Market Development: An Empirical Test of the Legal Origins Hypothesis, 6 Journal of Empirical
Legal Studies (2009), 343–381; J. Armour, S. Deakin, P. Lele and M. Siems, How Legal Norms
Evolve: Evidence from a Cross-country Comparison of Shareholder, Creditor and Worker protec-
tion, 57 American Journal of Comparative Law (2009), 579–629.
55 K. Hoover, S. Johansen and K. Juselius, Allowing the Data to Speak Freely: The
Macroeconometrics of the Cointegrated Vector Autoregression, 98 American Economic Review
(2011), 251–255.
56 S. Deakin, P. Sarkar and A. Singh, “An End to Consensus? The Selective Impact of Corporate
Law Reform on Financial Development”, in M. Aoki, K. Binmore, S. Deakin and H. Gintis (eds.),
Complexity and Institutions: Markets, Norms and Corporations (Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2012), ch. 9.
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takeover bids. These laws and regulations are largely drawn from the experience
of developed common law countries, most notably the UK and USA, during the
1990s. Longitudinal data show that while common law systems are generally
more protective of shareholder rights than civil law ones, the latter have been
“catching up” with former since the early 1990s. The dataset also shows that
company law reform has been a global phenomenon, with emerging markets,
and in particular transition systems, adjusting most quickly to the diffusion of
norms of investor protection over this period (Figures 1 and 2).
When these data are regressed against outcome variables in the form of country-
level measures of financial development, drawn from the IMF’s Financial
Structure Dataset using the CVAR approach to estimate the long-run impact of
legal changes, they indicate a positive impact of legal change on stock market
values (stock market capitalisation over GDP) for developing countries. There is
also evidence, in the developing world, of reverse causation, suggesting that
investor demand has, in part, been driving the rate of legal change in emerging
markets. For developed countries, the analysis reports a positive impact of







1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Common law Civil law
Figure 1: Shareholder protection in 30 countries, 1990–2014, comparing common law and civil
law origin countries.
Source: CBR Leximetric Database (<http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/research/projects/project2-
20output.htm>).
Note: The countries in the dataset are Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China,
Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania,
Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Slovenia, Sweden, South Africa,
Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, UK, USA.
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was no effect in civil law systems in the developed world. In contrast, analysis
shows that in emerging markets the positive impact of legal change on financial
development operates across the common law-civil law divide.57
These findings suggest that corporate governance reforms aimed at protect-
ing shareholder rights can have positive impacts in emerging markets where
equity markets are still developing and where firm-level governance remains
weak. They also imply that transplants work best where there is local demand
for legal reform which has been endogenously generated by economic growth
up to a certain point. Middle-income countries, once they reach a certain stage
of development, may be well placed to receive legal norms and institutions
which may assist the transition from clan-based transacting to impersonal,
market-based exchange.
5 Conclusion
Steve Lee58 has recently argued that for law and development to advance as a







1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Developed Developing Transition
Figure 2: Shareholder protection in 30 countries, 1990–2014, comparing developed, developing
and transition countries.
Source: See Figure 1.
57 Ibid.
58 Lee (2015), supra note 36.
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institutions contribute to sustainable economic development. This implies a
multi-level approach spanning theory and empirical research. We need a better
theory of law and state, and an improved understanding of the historical role of
both in seeding the process of industrialisation in the west, in order to assess the
conditions for sustainable economic growth in today’s low and middle-income
countries. We also need to deploy new social science methods including a
variety of statistical and econometric approaches. Our paper can be seen as a
contribution to the project that Lee has set out.
We have argued that public ordering – governance of agents’ strategic
behaviour through publicly articulated legal rules – is superior as a mode of
economic coordination to alternatives based on private ordering through inter-
personal trust, on the one hand, and authoritarian politics, on the other. Private
ordering within a dysfunctional public realm cannot progress beyond (relatively)
small numbers bargaining based on regional and familial networks and will
tend to degenerate into corruption, generating deadweight costs for society.
Authoritarian rule, conversely, can only go so far in supplying the public
goods needed for market exchange, before it too becomes weighed down by
high transaction costs associated with private capture of the state apparatus.
Many emerging markets currently suffer from a mix of clan-based contracting
and authoritarian political control which, we may hypothesise, is rapidly reach-
ing its limits.
Since the 1990s a huge investment has taken place across the world in rule
of law programmes which have sought to transplant elements of western models
of law and governance into emerging markets. These initiatives were not inher-
ently misguided: the rule of law is a critically important public good in advanced
industrial economies. All too often, however, rule of law initiatives failed to bed
down in contexts for which they were ill suited. The proponents of the western
liberal model neglected or overlooked the sense in which the rule of law state
was the product of centuries of evolution in the west which was frequently
stalled or even reversed, and which often turned on contingencies and chance
events.
For there to be a rule of law in which property and contract rights are
protected against predation, there must first be a state with the capacity to
undertake the task of constituting the market. Part of that state’s apparatus
must be a legal system which has the means to control not just abuses of private
power but other elements within the state, including the executive power of
government. This rule of law state is not self-forming, but requires complemen-
tary institutions in the realm of the market and of society more generally in order
to flourish. Thus the rule of law cannot simply be implanted in emerging
markets by an act of legislative will or through the borrowing or mimicking of
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institutions from outside. Yet the emergence of a rule of law state from initial
conditions which include network-based exchange and authoritarian political
control cannot at all be ruled out. Middle-income countries which have experi-
enced rapid economic growth without relying on formal legal institutions to get
to their present condition may be well placed, by virtue of the level of develop-
ment they have achieved, to make the transition to becoming rule of law states.
At least we can say that this is one feasible path among others for emerging
markets, and predict that some of them will take it in coming years.
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